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          From Normative Power to Great Power Politics: 
Change in the European Union’s Foreign Policy Identity 
 
Francesco Ortoleva
♣ 
 
Introduction and Research Question 
 
At  the  beginning  of  the  twenty-first  century,  one  of  the  most  significant  developments  in 
international relations is the important and growing role of the European Union (EU) as a global 
player in contemporary world politics. But what exactly is that role, how does the EU manage its 
relations with the external world and what identity does the EU wish to present to that world?  In 
other words, what is the foreign policy identity of the EU?  These are questions that analysts and 
scholars have grappled with since the formal creation of the EU at Maastricht in 1991 (Treaty on 
European Union).  
The EU has worked very carefully to foster a specific type of international identity. It is 
generally seen and theorized as a leader in the promotion of international peace and humanitarian 
issues. The EU presents itself as a normative force in world politics. It has customarily placed 
overriding emphasis on international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions, and 
multilateralism  in  its  foreign  policy,  while  eschewing  a  foreign  policy  based  on  traditional 
national interests and material gain.  The EU has, in fact, explicitly and formally announced these 
normative goals for its foreign policymaking in the second pillar of the Treaty on European 
Union, more commonly known as the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy).  But in a 
world  that  has  become  markedly  more  perilous  since  September  11,  2001,  many  Europeans 
consider U.S. unilateralism as dangerous as the putative terrorist activity it is attempting to halt. 
As a result, are we seeing the foreign policy identity of the EU begin to change?  Does the EU see 
itself as a possible balance against the primacy of the United States?  In other words, does the EU 
show  signs  of  transforming  to  a  more  traditional  foreign  policy  orientation;  one  based  on 
traditional great power politics and geared towards ensuring the most basic of state interests: 
survival, security and power?  This paper will investigate this transforming foreign policy identity 
of the EU by seeking to answer the following questions: If the EU’s foreign policy identity is 
indeed changing, then how is it changing, what is it becoming, and most importantly, what is 
causing it to change?  I will argue that the EU’s foreign policy identity is changing from a 
normative power to an identity based more closely on a great power politics model; and that the 
influence of epistemic communities or knowledge based networks is a primary catalyst  for this 
change.  
 Much has been written in recent years about the EU as an international actor.  In fact, the 
main approaches to EU foreign policy can be classified into three groups according to how they 
conceptualize the EU as an international actor: the EU as a state (H. Smith, 2002; K. Smith, 
2003), which looks at the EU thorough a state-centric framework of analysis;  the EU as a unique 
actor  or  sui  generis  (Krahmann,  2003;  M.  Smith,  2004),  which  theorizes  the  EU  as  having 
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different (non-state) motivations and interests as a result of its supranational construct; and a 
middle  ground  that  merges  the  other  two  approaches,  privileging  neither  the  EU  as  a  state 
conceptualization nor the EU as a unique actor, but incorporating both approaches in a foreign 
policy  analysis  hybridization  (White;  2001;  Tonra  and  Christiansen,  2004;  and  Carlsnaes, 
Sjursen, and White, 2004).  
While these approaches analyze the EU as an international actor, few look at it from the 
standpoint of foreign policy identity. In other words, what sort of international presence does the 
EU envisions for itself and wish to portray to the external world. Many assume that the EU, 
particularly when it is seen as a unique supranational entity, is a normative power (Manners, 
2002). Little, until recently, has been written that challenges this conceptualization. However, in 
the spring of 2006, the Journal of European Public Policy published a special issue that looked at 
this very question
1. In this special issue, some of the most important scholars in the field of 
European  foreign  policy  (EFP)  debated  the  role  of  the  EU  in  the  international  arena.  A 
preponderance of the scholarly conversation reiterated the normative power role that the EU itself 
has  promoted  since  Maastricht.  But  a  few  scholars  have  begun  to  question  whether  the  EU 
identity as a normative power has begun to erode (Manner, 2006; Sjursen, 2006). Recent policy 
papers on security and defense have shown indications that Europe is seriously becoming more 
active as a player in international security and, consequently, considering a more traditional and 
militarized international identity. Some scholars, including Ian Manners who first theorized a 
normative Europe construct in his seminal 2002 article, have even begun to talk of a burgeoning 
industrial-defense complex emerging in Brussels, which may be important in influencing the EU 
to change to a more traditional foreign policy orientation (Manners, 2006; Hyde-Pierce, 2006).  
What has been virtually neglected has been the growing influence of the transnational 
networks of knowledge based experts in foreign policy (Krahmann, 2003). The literature has 
often referred to these knowledge-based networks as epistemic communities (Haas, 1992). Many 
of these Brussels based epistemic communities have become quite vocal in their call for the EU to 
pursue  a  more  traditional  power  politics  model  of  foreign  policy  in  order  to  balance  U.S. 
dominance and secure Europe against the current ubiquitous threats. This paper seeks to begin a 
discussion, all be cursorily, on the influence of these epistemic communities and thereby add to 
the conversation that the EU’s foreign policy identity is being transformed to a model based on 
great power politics. I will do so by arguing the following thesis:  The influence of European 
epistemic communities has affected change in the foreign policy identity of the European Union, 
transforming it from one that is based on normative power to one that is based on traditional 
great power politics.  
This paper will begin with a review of the extant literature on EU foreign policy
2. This 
literature review will start with a general review of some of the seminal works in the field of EU 
foreign policy studies. This will give us a clear perspective of where the scholarship on EU 
foreign policy has gone, what the theoretical arguments have been, and what this paper’s research 
might contribute to the subfield of EU foreign policy studies and to the field of EU studies in 
general. The literature review will then shift focus to the current work being done on EU foreign 
policy identity. After the literature review, the paper will then focus in on the current theoretical 
approach to Europe’s international identity, with a focus on whether Europe is a normative or 
civilian power.  I then shall move to the question of how the EU’s foreign policy identity is 
changing and what evidence can we gather to corroborate that claim. Again, it is my contention 
that the EU foreign policy identity is transforming from one based on normative power to one 
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European Public Policy. Vol. 13. (March 2006). 
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based great power politics. Finally, and key to my future research, I will investigate the influence 
of both Brussels-based and national epistemic communities on this foreign policy transformation.  
On a cautionary note, the reader must bear in mind that this paper is not the finished 
product of rigorous and completed research; it is rather a scholarly exploration into a possibly 
productive future research endeavor. Therefore, this paper’s intent is to begin a discourse that 
challenges the current theorizing on the EU’s international identity by looking at some of the 
important outputs and influences on EU foreign policy making. It, therefore, does not claim to be 
a completed research project but rather an inquisitive commencement. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Before  we  investigate  the  changing  identity  of  the  EU’s  foreign  policy,  a  review  of  some 
contemporary European foreign policy literature is necessary. What is immediately evident in any 
cursory look at the study of EU foreign policy is a lack of a coherent approach. Because of this 
incoherence,  a  simple  typology  of  theoretical  approaches  might  prove  helpful.  The  works 
reviewed here will be classified into three groups according to how they conceptualize the EU as 
an international actor: the EU as a state, the EU as a unique actor, and a middle ground that 
merges various approaches with Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This is done because how an 
analyst envisions the EU as an actor will, in most cases, determine their theoretical framework. 
For instance, if an analyst sees the EU as an international organization, that analyst might be 
predisposed to an intergovernmentalist framework of analysis.
3   
In terms of the EU as a state, the work of Hazel Smith (2002) and Karen Smith (2003) are 
important. In her book, European Union Foreign Policy: What it is and What it Does, Hazel 
Smith asks a rhetorical question “Does the European Union have a foreign policy?”  Her answer 
is unequivocal: the EU does indeed have a foreign policy, and it is much the same as that of the 
nation-state” (Smith, 2002: 7). She outlines six arguments for disposing of current objections to 
the very idea of an EU foreign policy. These objections are grouped into two main categories, 
pertaining to either structural and/or institutional deficiencies, on the one hand, or to the capacity 
of the EU to pursue a foreign policy of its own, on the other hand (Smith, 2002: 1). All six of 
these recognized objections – that the EU is not a sovereign entity, that it is a subordinate actor to 
its member states, that it lacks a centralized decision-making as well as military capacity, that it is 
not very effective in international crisis-management, and the so-called ‘capability-expectation 
gap’ argument – are quickly dismissed by Smith, leading her to conclude that “the EU does 
indeed have a foreign policy and that it can be analysed in pretty much the same way as  we can 
analyze that of any nation-state” (Smith, 2002:1).  
Smith has no problems with the idea that the EU has a foreign policy much like that any 
other state actor. Her argument is clear on this point: “Foreign policy is the capacity to make and 
implement policies aboard which promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the actor 
in question”, and since, in her view the EU does possess all of these attributes, it behaves as a 
state and, therefore, has a foreign policy (Smith, 2002: 7). It can be characterized thus due to “its 
developed  philosophy  based  on  liberal  capitalist  democracy,  and  its  panoply  of  domestic 
competencies and policies on issues ranging from the common market to co-operation in policing 
and judicial matters” (Smith, 2002: 7-8). This view puts her at complete odds with the “sui 
generis” (EU as a unique actor) scholars to be reviewed below. 
Smith’s analytical approach is to explicitly shun a procedural or institution path – to not 
equate European foreign policy with what “emanates from the procedures of the CFSP” (Smith, 
2002: 8). Instead, she favors what she calls the “geo-issue-area approach”, involving foci which 
                                                           
     
3 Although popular in the 1980s and the 1990’s (see the work of Nugent, 1994), the “EU as an international 
organization” approach will not be considered in this review because it has become less relevant in contemporary EU 
studies, particularly in European foreign policy analysis.  
 
6 
6 
“engage with either the geographical reach of the Union abroad or which attempt to evaluate the 
various issues with which the Union has involved itself abroad” (Smith, 2002: 9). Beyond this 
empirically focused framework of analysis, no particular theory is advanced in this study; instead 
Smith notes that there are not really any “theoretical obstacles to adopting the approach that the 
EU has a foreign policy that it exercises throughout the world in a number of different issue 
areas” (Smith, 2002: 269). Smith is also quite contemptuous of what she calls the “institutionalist 
ghetto  of  European  integration  analysis  which  concentrates  on  procedure  at  the  expense  of 
substance…in defence of the idea that CFSP procedures as written in the treaties should limit the 
scope of inquiry into EU foreign policy” (Smith, 2002: 269-270). It is to Smith’s credit that she 
does give us an empirical look at the output of EU foreign policy-making system. Smith seems to 
understand  that  substance  is  sorely  missing  in  much  of  the  scholarship  on  European  foreign 
policy. 
Karen Smith’s book, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (2003), also 
follows Hazel Smith’s analytical approach by avoiding procedural or institutional analysis and 
focuses on issue areas. For Smith, the EU acts very much like a state in the international arena 
and goes about pursuing its foreign policy objective very much like a state (Smith, 2003: 195-
198). What is unique and distinctive about the EU as an international actor is the interests it 
pursues, not how it pursues those interests. Smith is a strong proponent of the EU as a normative 
power. This will be discussed in more depth below. 
On the opposite side, conceptually speaking, of “the EU as a state” scholars are the sui 
generis or “the EU as a unique actor” scholars. Again, these scholars and writers look at the 
institutions  and  procedures  that  lead  to  the  formulation  of  a  European  foreign  policy.  Their 
concern is with process rather than the substantive output that preoccupied Hazel Smith. Two 
works representative of this approach are Michael E. Smith’s Europe’s Foreign and Security 
Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (2004) and Elke Krahmann’s Multilevel Networks 
in European Foreign Policy (2003).  
Michael E. Smith examines European foreign policy, specifically CFSP, in terms of its 
inherent  nature  as  an  example  of  institutionalized  multilateral  cooperation  among  sovereign, 
independent  states.  To  Smith  “European  integration  is  largely  an  ongoing  discourse  about 
institutions: how to translate very general common values or aspirations into specific collective 
policies or behaviors, internal and external, through the application of norms and rules” (Smith, 
2004:  9).  Smith  defines  “EU  foreign  policy”,  “European  foreign  policy  (EFP)”  or 
“foreign/security policy cooperation” (he uses these terms interchangeably) as cooperative actions 
“(1) undertaken on behalf of all EU states toward non-members, international bodies, or global 
events or issues; (2) oriented toward a specific goal; (3) made operational with physical activity, 
such as financing or diplomacy; and (4) undertaken in the context of  CFSP discussions” (Smith, 
2004: 18). The emphasis here is on institutionalized cooperation on the part of the EU member 
states, specifically in situations in which “states did not perceive themselves as having identical 
interests  in  a  given  choice  situation,  yet…attempted  to  adjust  their  foreign  policies  to 
accommodate  each  other”  (Smith,  2004:  18).    This  type  of  policy  coordination  necessarily 
involves  active  efforts  on  the  part  of  member  states  to  achieve  a  common  end,  and  is, 
consequently,  a  highly  purposive  and  conjoined  type  of  activity  heavily  dependent  on 
institutionalized forms of cooperation. 
The purpose of this book is to trace and explain the institutionalization of cooperation in 
Europe since the early days of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), an earlier form of CFSP 
pre-Maastricht. He explores how cooperation in foreign and security policy in Europe grew from 
a very informal, ex-legal, ad hoc system had been formally institutionalized into a legally binding 
policymaking process capable of producing common positions and joint actions on a wide range 
of global problems. Smith does this by explaining how changes in institutional context, in terms 
of intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational procedures, affect the propensity for 
cooperation, and then linking processes of institutionalization to an expansion of foreign policy  
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cooperation among member states. This is a dynamic relationship: cooperation can encourage 
actors to build institutions, but institutions themselves should foster cooperative outcomes, which 
later influence the process of institution-building through feedback mechanisms. Smith argues 
that “there is a reciprocal relationship between institution-building and cooperation and that in the 
case  of  foreign  policy  this  has  meant  a  progressive  expansion  of  both  the  institutional 
mechanisms and substantive outcomes of cooperation” (Smith, 2004: 239-240). This process has 
led to the institutionalization of a EU foreign policy capacity, embodied in the CFSP, defined in 
terms of both regular, substantive policy outcomes and a set of explicit aspirations or goals. 
Elke Krahmann’s study continues the idea of the EU as a unique actor by again looking at 
how institutions and procedures, which she classifies as networks, distinguish the EU from any 
other actor in the contemporary international system. Krahmann favors employing a different 
definition of European Union foreign policy, one which pertains to the decisions and actions of 
core European states and their multilateral organizations which are primarily concerned with the 
welfare of the region (2003:3). The reason for this new conceptualization is that European foreign 
policy cannot, she claims, be reduced to the actions of the EU alone, nor to those of its member 
states, since not only are these “influenced by the United States and vice versa, but also there are 
key European foreign policy decisions taken and implemented by a broad range of national and 
multinational institutions, including the United Nations and NATO” (Krahmann, 2003: 3). As a 
consequence of this complex set of relationships and foreign policy decision-making processes 
characterized  by  the  increasing  multiplicity,  diversity  and  interdependence  of  foreign  policy 
actors, she proposes the use of a multilevel network approach to incorporate the behavior of 
national, transnational and international actors within the European context. In her view, this 
behavior  can  best  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  notion  of  rational,  utility  maximizing  actors 
attempting to influence one another’s preferences in the pursuit of European foreign policies 
(Krahmann, 2003: 34). For empirical evidence, she uses this approach in three case studies of 
European foreign policy decision-making: the first focusing on the EU’s dual-use export control 
agreement, the second on transatlantic community’s endorsement of the air strikes in Bosnia, and 
the third on the how the United Kingdom’s air-to-missile project was affected by this multilevel 
European foreign policy network.
4   
Krahmann’s  argument  is  sophisticated  and  well  argued,  but  it  ultimately  seems 
incomplete. While she looks at national, transnational, and international levels of the European 
system, little discussion is given to the subnational level. This seems like a notable oversight 
considering all the attention regions and subnational identity have received recently from EU 
scholars.
5  More importantly, for the scope of this paper, Smith neglects to mention the growing 
influence of epistemic communities in her multilevel network approach. This seems odd given 
her focus on the multiplicity of foreign policy actors in the EU.  
  The third group of our simple typology of EU foreign policy scholarship is a middle 
ground between the “EU as a state” and the “EU as a unique actor” conceptualizations. While this 
scholarship seeks to theorize EU foreign policy as not quite that of a state’s, it also recognizes 
that it is not completely unique or “sui generis”; it therefore may use some traditional tools or 
frameworks of analysis that are associated with state centric models. However, these analytical 
frameworks must be adapted to the particulars of the EU as an international actor, which is 
neither  state,  international  organization,  or  completely  unique.  By  far  the  most  accepted 
framework of analysis used by EU foreign policy analysts is FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis). As 
we shall see in Brian White’s work, this is an FPA that is adjusted for the peculiarities of EU 
foreign policy or what he calls a “transformational FPA” (White, 2001). In edited works by Ben 
                                                           
    
4 This case study is also used by Brian White (2001) in his discussion of the national foreign policies of member 
states  and  how  they  are  affected  by  the  EU.  So  a  connection  may  exist  between  multilevel  network  theory  and 
Europeanization, but may be simply an instance of looking at different causes but same effect (a less independent 
national foreign policy of an EU member state).  
    
5 See the work of Dell’ Olio (2005), Dunkerly et al (2002), and Citrin and Sides (2004).  
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Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (2004) and Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White 
(2004), other theoretical approaches to EFP, including constructivist, are discussed but FPA is 
given the most coverage. In fact, White has a chapter in each of these edited volumes in which he 
argues for the application of an “adapted” FPA to the study of European foreign policy.  
  In his book, Understanding European Foreign Policy (2001), White argues that EFP is 
more than just the foreign policy of the EU. Unlike Hazel Smith and Michael E. Smith, who use 
the “EU” and “European” interchangeable, White believes EU foreign policy to be one part of 
three that are intertwined to make up an EFP. Community foreign policy (or “Pillar I” external 
relations), referring to the foreign policy of the European Community (EC) established by the 
Treaties  of  Rome  in  1957,  and  which  today  can  be  said  to  constitute  the  foreign  economic 
dimension of EFP; Union foreign policy which, until the Single European Act of 1986, consisted 
of member states in the process called European Political Cooperation (EPC), and subsequently 
upgraded and formalized in the second pillar form of the CSFP; and national foreign policy, 
pursued by the member states but increasingly under the institutional influence of the EU as a 
whole (White, 2001: 40-41).  White refers to these strands or parts as foreign policy sub-systems 
(2001: 166). White’s main point is that “European foreign policy as a whole is conceived as an 
interacting foreign policy “system” but these types of policy are regarded as the “sub-systems” 
that  constitute  and  possibly  dominate  it”(White,  2001:  24).  White  never  gives  us  a  formal 
definition, his point is that defining EFP in terms of just one or two of these sub-systems is too 
restrictive,
6 since “European governance in the foreign policy field appears to take all forms and 
if it is to be useful for analytical purposes, the concept has to encompass the fragmented nature of 
agency at the European level and the variety of forms of action” implied with this three part 
conceptualization of EFP (White, 2001: 39). However, he does make an important point about 
how the distinction between these three foreign policy sub-systems tends blur as they become 
more interwoven over time.  “Clearly, the more extensive the interrelationships between them, the 
more justified we are in using the label European foreign policy” (Smith, 2001: 39). 
White  uses  an  adjusted  FPA  as  his  frame  work  of  analysis.  This  is  composed  of  an 
interrelated set of elements consisting of actors, capabilities/instruments, context, and actions/ 
output. The system is described as follows: “the nature of the policy process is affected by the 
identity of the actors involved, the issues being dealt with, the policy instruments available, and 
not least, the context within which policy is made….these interrelationships in turn generate the 
outputs from the system” (White 2001: 40).  
Having established a “transformed” FPA as his epistemological guide, White proceeds to 
analyze the three types of European foreign policy by looking at case studies that empirically bear 
out his sub-system formulation. The most interesting in terms of future research possibilities is 
the  national  foreign  policy  case  study  in  which  he  looks  at  the  effects  European  foreign 
policymaking has had on the British national foreign policy. His argument is that national foreign 
policies have undergone a “Europeanization”, one that is empirically illustrated by the case of 
Britain. This case is important because, as White points out, “Britain is the perhaps the least 
appropriate member to analyse in this context, successive governments having staunchly resisted 
the whole process of Europeanization” since it joined the EEC in 1973 (White, 2001: 118). “To 
the  extent  that  British  foreign  policy  has  been  “Europeanized”  despite  apparently  strong 
resistance from British governments, Europeanization can be said to be a significant process 
indeed in the construction of a European foreign policy” (White, 2001: 119). 
Overall, White’s arguments and conclusions about how we should conceptualize EFP, 
through a three sub-system model; and how we theorize EFP, through the use of an adapted FPA, 
are convincing. This adaptation of FPA is important because it moves it from a strictly state-
centric, and unitary, realist approach to one that moves beyond the state as the only actor and 
                                                           
     
6 This is quite different from Michael E. Smith’s definition that portrays EFP as strictly pertaining to the procedures 
and outputs of the CFSP.  
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incorporates non-state actors as important determinants of foreign policymaking. This opens the 
door  for  looking  at  other  important  foreign  policy  inputs  such  as  the  influence  of  epistemic 
communities  on  foreign  policymaking.  White’s  reconceptualization  of  FPA  may  have  laid 
important steps in salvaging an anachronistic sub-discipline of IR and given us a strong way, 
epistemologically speaking, of approaching EFP.  
As  mentioned  previously,  other  approaches  are  available  to  analysts  and  scholars  of 
European foreign policy. In Tonra and Christiansen edited book, Rethinking the European Union 
Foreign Policy (2004), we are given a variety of approaches to study EU foreign policy that may 
be considered constructivist. Like White, Tonra and Christiansen expand the conceptualization of 
EU foreign policy to be more than the intergovernmental CFSP. It involves “the totality of the 
EU’s external relations, combining political, economic, humanitarian, and more recently, also 
military instruments at the disposal of the Union” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 2). It is the study 
of this broader concept, going beyond traditional, exclusive focus on CFSP, that is the main 
purpose  of  this  book.  In  particular,  the  book  addresses  three  challenges  that  arise  from  the 
development  of  foreign  policy  in  the  EU  over  the  past  decade:  first,  it  suggests  ways  of 
reconceptualizing the external relation of the European Union as foreign policy and therefore to 
apply concepts to the study of this area that draw on the insights of approaches from the wider 
field of FPA. Second, it discusses the positioning of the study of EFP in relation to the discipline 
of international relations, in recognition of the transformation that the European construction has 
undergone in the recent past. And third, it links developments in the debate about integration 
theory,  in  particular  the  constructivist  challenge  to  the  established  rationalist  and 
intergovernmentalist approaches, to the study of EFP (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 2). “Taken 
together, this book suggests new ways in which European Union foreign policy can be studied in 
the context of the significant theoretical advancements and empirical developments that occurred 
during the 1990s” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 3). It is, however, the third challenge that is the 
core theme in most of the contributions in this book. The contributors wish to “rethink” EFP by 
using constructivism. By taking a constructivist approach, they can consider ways in which the 
interests, values, ideas and beliefs of actors are themselves explanatory variables. This does not 
necessarily exclude rationalism. In other words it might not just be about “side-payments” but it 
might also be about the origins, dynamics and evolution of an actor’s beliefs and interests. “EU 
foreign policy might also be seen not to be about rationalist calculation at all but to be understood 
as being all about identity creation” (Tonra & Christiansen, 2004: 8). To Tonra and Christiansen, 
“this post-positivist turn need not necessarily go so far as some post-structuralist approaches: 
those far countries of postmodernism where language is everything and there are no material  
constructs,  only  discourse”  (Tonra  &  Christiansen,  2004:  9).  It  does,  however,  offer  a 
fundamental challenge to rationalistic accounts with which several of the authors in this text 
engage
7.  It  is  thus  Tonra’s  and  Christiansen’s,  along  with  most  of  the  authors  in  this  book, 
contention that EFP is an “ideal empirical testing ground” for what might be called a hard-core 
constructivist approach. This book points out nicely that EFP might be an area where first order 
constructivist theorizing might finally occur. The EU, with its overarching emphasis on identity, 
beliefs, norms, and rules, is a perfect evidentiary milieu for constructivists looking for a space to 
build theories.  
Unlike Tonra and Christiansen’s book (2004), which is a theoretical discussion about the 
analysis of EU foreign policy and the possible approaches the may be employed in that pursuit, 
Walter Carlsnaes, Helene Sjursen, and Brian White’s Contemporary European Foreign Policy 
(2004)  is an edited work about theory and issue areas. The first part of the book contains chapters 
by Brian White (2004) on FPA’s application to EU foreign policy and an interesting chapter by 
Knud Erik Jorgensen (2004) about conceptualizing EU foreign policy. Jorgensen argument in this 
chapter is that nature of European foreign policy has been changed in the last two decades. “The 
                                                           
    
7 See chapter by Adrain Hyde-Price, “Interests, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy”.  
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end of the Cold War and the developments within the EU since have changed the nature of 
foreign  policy  in  Europe,  both  with  respect  to  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy  by  individual 
European states and by the EU itself” (Jorgensen, 2004: 32). Jorgensen concludes that in order to 
improve  our  understanding  of  EU  foreign  policy  we  need  to  refine  further  our  conceptual 
framework of analysis, keeping in mind that contemporary EU foreign policy is conducted at 
several levels, implying that mutually constitutive features should be privileged (Jorgensen, 2004: 
50). Furthermore, EU foreign policy is conducted by a number of different sets of collective 
actors, applying several methods of decision-making, and making policies that are more or less 
efficient in terms of reaching stated goals (Jorgensen, 2004: 51). In essence, Jorgensen is calling 
for  a  specifically  “European”  foreign  policy  analysis,  one  that  helps  specialist  create  foreign 
policy theories that are specific to the European condition, but, he warns us, of little applicability 
elsewhere. Whether that is a satisfactory state of things remains an issue for prudent consideration 
(Jorgensen, 2004: 51). 
The second and third part of the Tonra and Christiansen book addresses analytical issue 
area like diplomacy, security, defense, human rights and sovereignty, and applied case studies to 
each  of  these  analytical  topics.  One  chapter  of  particular  importance  to  this  paper  is  Ulrich 
Sedelmeier chapter on collective identity. Sedelmeier points out that while much has been written 
on collective identity formation in the European Union, scholars have barely used these insights 
on EU foreign policy (Sedelmeier, 2004: 123). This chapter suggests that we can gain important 
insights  into  EU  foreign  policy  from  a  perspective  that  acknowledges  that  the  EU’s  identity 
matters  causally  for  foreign  policy.  “A  focus  on  identity  formation  at  the  EU  level  allows 
additional  factors,  beyond  materialist  ones,  to  be  taken  into  account,  namely  the  evolving 
discourse about the EU’s international role and about constitutive norms at the EU level that 
defines  a  collective  identity  for  policy  makers  from  the  member  governments  and  EU 
institutions”  (Sedelmeier,  2004:  136).  Sedelmeier  also  points  out  that  one  area  where  such 
identity formation at the EU level has become particularly salient for European foreign policy 
since the end of the Cold War is the area of the protection of human rights and promotion of 
democracy.  
 
Normative or Civilian Power Euorpe? 
 
The contribution by Sedelmeier leads us to a discussion on the research that has arisen around this 
idea of EU foreign policy being driven by a normative construct. This external projection of EU 
identity  has  lead  many  to  surmise  the  EU  as  a  normative  power  in  international  relations. 
Whereas much attention was traditionally paid to the question of whether or not there is such a 
thing as EU foreign policy and if there is, how do we go about analyzing it.  The current analysis 
now  looks  at  how  we  can  conceptualize  this  EU  foreign  policy.  In  other  words,  what 
characterizes  this  foreign  policy  (Sjursen,  2006).    In  this  context,  a  number  of  authors  have 
stressed the “particularity” of the EU. In developing their argument, many scholars have often 
built  upon  Francois  Duchene’s  (1972)  idea  of  the  EU  as  a  “civilian  power”.  According  to 
Duchene, the particularity of the EC’s (EU) international role is linked to the “nature” of the 
polity itself (1972, 33). For Duchene, the EC’s (EU) strength and novelty as an international actor 
is based on its ability to extend its own model of ensuring stability and security through economic 
and  political  rather  than  military  means  (1972,  33).  Many  more  contemporary  scholars  have 
picked up on this idea and developed it further (Rosencrance, 1998; Whitman, 1998; Manners, 
2002;  Diez,  2004;  Smith,  2003).  What  these  scholars  share  is  an  interest  in  the  normative 
dimension to EU foreign policy. For scholars like Ian Manners (2002), the idea of the EU as a 
civilian power was important but limited. “The EU and its actions in world politics demand a 
wider and more appropriate approach in order to reflect what its is, does and should do” (2002: 
238). Manners uses the phrase “normative power Europe” in order to attempt to capture the 
movement away Cold War approaches to the EU (2006: 184). Based on his research into the  
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symbolic and normative discourses and practices of the European Community (EC)/EU during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, Manners developed the “normative power Europe” approach as a response 
to the relative absence of normative theorizing and to promote normative approaches to the EU 
(2006:  184).  For  Manners  (2002),  EU  foreign  policy  is  about  norm  diffusion  rather  than 
promoting state-centric interests. This diffusion of norms is shaped by six factors: contagion, 
informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter 
(Manners, 2002: 244-45). In his conceptualization of EU foreign policy, Manners argues that 
what  has  been  significant  in  these  norms  diffusion  factors  has  been  the  relative  absence  of 
physical  force  in  the  imposition  of  these  norms.  This  absence  of  physical  force  and  the 
importance of cultural diffusion led Manners to argue that “the most important factor shaping the 
international role of the EU is not what it does or what is says, but what it is” (Manners, 2002: 
252). As Helene Sjursen, a EU foreign policy analyst, writes, “the argument in this literature 
tends to be that the EU is distinguished from other actors because it is not only a civilian power 
but also a normative, civilizing, or ethical power within the international system. (Sjursen, 2006: 
170). 
An important work that picks up this idea is the aforementioned work by Karen Smith 
(2003). Smith intends to show how the EU’s foreign policy has become one that uses norms and 
norm promotion in its formulation. To Smith, norms are the guiding values that determine the 
course of EU foreign policy. Smith argues that EU’s international identity is tied to the promotion 
of five foreign policy objectives: the encouragement of regional cooperation; the advancement of 
human  right;  the  promotion  of  democracy  and  good  governance;  the  prevention  of  violent 
conflicts; and the fight against international crime. This normativity in EU foreign policy makes it 
quite unique among other actors in the international system. 
Smith’s work is important because it adds to the voices that call the EU a normative 
power. One critique that can be levied at Smith and other scholars who promote the idea of a 
normative power Europe is their neglect of change. They do not deal with the possibility that this 
guiding normativity or the norm diffusion identity of EU foreign policy might change due to 
external and internal factors. 
Interestingly, it is Ian Manners, the originator of the “normative power Europe” construct 
that begins to question it as a valid analytical tool. In his most recent article for the Journal of 
European Public Policy in the spring of 2006, Manners detects a transformation of EU foreign 
policy identity (Manners, 2006: 189-93).  In this seminal article in field of EU foreign policy 
analysis, Manners puts forth the idea that the continued militarization of the EU is endangering 
the normative power of the EU as an international actor. He proceeds to prove this by analyzing 
the  influence  of  the  “military  industrial  simplex”  in  Brussels  and  the  various  epistemic 
communities that have appeared in the EU capital. His conclusion is that the EU maybe losing its 
normative identity in foreign policy. Others have also recently begun to follow Manners lead (see 
Quille, 2004; Sjursen, 2006; Hyde-Price, 2006). It is here, in this discourse of a change in the way 
the EU projects itself internationally, that my argument is generated. I will now explore, in more 
depth this idea of a transforming EU foreign policy identity.  
 
The European Union as a Great Power 
    
For scholars like Manners (2006) and others, the acquisition of military means, or the EU’s 
ambition to acquire such means, might weaken the argument that the EU is a normative  power. It 
could provoke a shift, making EU foreign policy more akin to that of traditional great powers. As 
Sjursen points out, “it raises the question about whether the EU can be considered a normative or 
civilian power” (2006: 171).  In Manners estimation, the militarizing processes provided for by 
various policy instruments such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) and others, are already 
weakening the normative claims of the EU in a post-September 11
th world characterized by the 
drive  towards  “martial  potency”  and  the  growth  of  a  Brussels  based  “military  –industrial  
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simplex”  (Manners,  2006:  182).  It  is  my  contention  in  this  paper  that  this  is  changing  the 
personality of the EU on the international stage or, more precisely, the identity of the EU’s 
foreign policy to one that is more recognizable in the personality of a rising, power seeking state. 
  The continued militarization of the EU beyond 2003 now poses risks and consequences 
to the EU’s normative power in world politics (Manners, 2006). The year 2003 is a watershed 
year in European foreign and security policy.  It is marks the adoption by the EU of the European 
Security  Strategy  (ESS). 
8    This  important  document  produced  by  the  General  Affairs  and 
External Relations Council (GAERC) states the security goals of the EU. It is particularly salient 
to this paper because it is prima facie evidence of the EU’s changing international identity. This 
security strategy document calls for an increase in the EU’s military capability. It also indicates 
that the changing security environment may effectively force the EU to become more active as a 
world player in security. This document shows explicitly that the EU is considering changing its 
foreign and security identity from a normative based model or “civilian” power. 
     …more active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of 
instruments  for  crisis  management  and  conflict  prevention  at  our  disposal,  including 
political,  diplomatic,  military  and  civilian,  trade  and  development  activities.  Active 
policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic 
culture  that  fosters  early,  rapid,  and  when  necessary,  robust  intervention  (European 
Security Strategy 2003: 17). 
 
As Gerard Quille, a European security specialist, argued in a recent article, “the ESS may 
be an important first step along the road to an EU strategic culture” (Quille, 2004: 249). Although 
many have disagreed about the precise direction of the road marked “strategic culture”, it is clear 
to Manners, Quille and others that since the end of 2003 the “EU has taken a sharp turn away 
form the normative path of peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention, 
as the ESS suggests”(Manners, 2006:189). 
  These scholars who have moved way from the normative power Europe construct that 
Manners has originally put forth, now consider the way in which the events of September 11
th, 
2001 and the March 11, 2004 (Madrid Train Bombings), together with the transatlantic crises 
created by the invasion of Iraq, diverted the EU on a road towards militarization by “martial 
potency” and driven by the growth of a Brussels based military-industrial simplex (Manners, 
2006:  189).  Manners,  in  particular,  focuses  in  on  EU  militarization  by  considering  the 
institutional  prioritization,  short-  and  long-term  military  missions,  the  Brussels-based 
transnational  policy  and  knowledge  networks,  the  diverting  of  the  human  security  agenda  in 
Brussels, all culminating in the development of a military-industrial simplex (Manners, 2006: 
189-90).  
  As one analyst points out “despite the widespread expectation that the civilian ESDP 
missions are more likely than military one’s, and that five out of six on-going European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions are non-military
9, the extent of institutional prioritization of 
military structures and frameworks is apparent” (Keane, 2004: 498). This prioritization includes 
the  emphasis  given  to  identifying  and  achieving  military  capabilities  ahead  of  civilian 
capabilities,  as  the  Capabilities  Commitment  Conference  implicitly  recognized  in  November 
2004 when it acknowledged the “shortcomings on issues such as mission and planning support, 
adequate  financing,  the  ability  of  the  EU  to  deploy  at  short  notice  and  procurement  to  be 
addressed urgently”.
10   As the quote from the ESS, cited above, illustrates, “in a strategic culture 
                                                           
    
8 European Council. (2003) “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, European Security Strategy. December 12, 2003, 
Brussels: European Council Archives.   
    
9  See EUPM, EUPOL Proxima, EUJUST Themis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUJUST Lex, which are example of policing, 
institution building or technical assistance program by the EU in places like sub-Saharan Africa. 
    
10 From Netherlands Presidency (2004) “European Security and Defence Policy Report”, Official Document No. 19, 
endorsed by the European Council, December 2004.  
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favoring robust intervention, civilian activities appear to be useful only in as far as they are 
needed to counter new dynamic threats, thus subverting the normative approach” (Manners, 2006: 
190). 
 
The Influence of Epistemic Communities 
 
What is driving this change of foreign policy identity?  How has the EU started to transform from 
what  Manners  (2002)  originally  termed  a  “normative  power  Europe”  to  a  growing  power  in 
which militarization and the growth of a strategic culture makes its international identity more in 
line with a traditional great power politics model?  Manners believes that it is a growing military-
industrial simplex that is driving this change. That this system or network of European defense 
contractors, lobbyists, the EU bureaucracy, and other actors, has driven the EU to change its 
direction. For Manners, the motive for this transformation is a mix of economic benefits for the 
indigenous defense industry and real concern that exogenous events in world politics must impel 
the EU to prepare itself to intervene militarily around the world. I argue that while these factors 
are important, the influence of the policy institutes, think tanks, the defense industry lobby, and a 
burgeoning network of security scholars and analysts form as a European epistemic community 
which may be the key to understanding this transformation of the EU’s foreign policy orientation.    
A quick review of this increasingly important theoretical concept is appropriate here. 
Epistemic  communities  have  become  an  important  research  focus  of  the  more  reflective  IR 
theorists, in particular, the constructivists
11. Peter Haas (1992) has defined epistemic communities 
as a network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within the domain of their expertise…“they are channels thorough which new ideas 
circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country” (Haas, 1992: 27). 
Haas has theorized that they influence state interest in four ways: Elucidating the cause and effect 
relationships and providing advice about the likely results of various courses of actions following 
a shock or crisis; shedding light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and 
on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to take action or from instituting a 
particular policy; helping to define the self-interests of a state or factions within it; and helping to 
formulate policies through framing of alternatives and implications of possible actions (Haas, 
1992). Epistemic communities have been a tremendous influence in American foreign policy 
since the beginning of the Cold War. I argue that their European counterparts are starting to have 
the same influence on EU foreign and security policymaking.  
  One  evidentiary  example  of  the  influence  of  these  epistemic  communities  is  the 
prioritization of military affairs in CFSP policymaking. The CFSP and its EC predecessor, the 
EPC, have always put human security at the forefront of its agenda. Human security refers to the 
normative aspects of foreign and security policy. In the EU, it has specifically meant people-
centered freedom from fear and want (Manners, 2006 192). This would include the promotion of 
human and economic rights and conflict prevention through international institutions. But there 
are explicit indications that this idea of human security has lost its priority status. Manners (2006) 
points out that the Barcelona Report makes clear that the new European security doctrine (ESS) 
prioritizes the appropriate use of force over both freedom and human rights (192). Some critics of 
the EU’s rising militarization have noted that “the increasing emphasis on security issues, the 
fight against terrorism and concerns over weapons of mass destruction, threaten to overshadow all 
European foreign policy, leaving little or no room for policies geared towards human security 
(Van Reisen, Stocker, & Sebban, 2004:36).  
Another example of the change brought about these epistemic communities is the way the 
EU is reconceptualizing its fighting force, the limited RRF. Jocelyn Mawdsley, a noted European 
                                                           
     
11 For the use of epistemic communities in constructivism, see the work of Emanuel Adler (1992), Adler & Haas 
(1992); and Adler & Bernstein (2005)  
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security analyst, has closely scrutinized the way in which the limited equipment  needs of the 
RRF (Rapid Reaction Force) have been quickly expanded into a quantitatively different arms 
dynamic by the activism of a Brussels-based transnational policy network, particularly those that 
have  an  intimately  intertwined  with  various  European  defense  industry  lobbies  (Mawdsley, 
2004). What Mawdsley points out is the way in which the pre-2001 agreements on a RRF were 
rapidly altered after the 2003 military arrangements for “preventative engagement” by those who 
sought to gain from such a change.
12  I would argue in the case of the EU, the Brussels-based 
epistemic communities are those actors who would gain from such a transformation in foreign 
and  security  policy  orientation  or  identity.  In  particular,  these  epistemic  communities  see 
militarization  as  an  opportunity  to  empower  their  political  role,  as  well  as  achieving  deeper 
security (Manners, 2006: 191). 
So in review, the argument made by scholars like Manners (2006), Quille (2004), Sjursen 
(2006) and others is that the militarization of the EU called for by the passage in 2003 of the 
European Security Strategy is deteriorating the normative power identity of the EU. This, in turn, 
will lead to the EU adopting a more traditional great power politics model of foreign policy 
identity.  I  hope  to  contribute  to  this  discourse  by  arguing  that  this  change  of  foreign  policy 
identity is being heavily influenced by the policy institutes and knowledge based network in 
Brussels  and  in  various  member  state  capitals.  These  epistemic  communities,  motivated  by 
political power and influence or even genuine concern for the security of the EU, have been quite 
successful in effecting this change of identity. While Manners (2006) and others acknowledge the 
influence  of  these  knowledge  and  policy  institutes,  I  wish  to  take  the  argument  further  by 
illustrating through evidence that these epistemic communities are a main driving force behind 
this  foreign  and  security  policy  transformation.  In  terms  of  my  causal  argument,  epistemic 
communities are my independent variable, while the foreign policy identity of the EU is my 
dependent variable. The type of empirical evidence that I wish to investigate in the near future for 
this causal argument is reviewed below.  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a 
rigorous investigation of these epistemic communities in any depth, I wish to identify some of the 
actors and networks who may be important subjects for future research. First, I shall review some 
prima fascia evidence of a changing EU foreign policy identity. Then, the essay will conclude 
with a review of some of the key European based epistemic communities that may be important 
in future research. 
 
Evidence for a Change in EU Foreign Policy Identity 
 
To ascertain a change in foreign policy identity, we will need to look at the discourses and texts 
put out by the foreign policymakers of the EU. This will include official policy papers put out by 
institutional committees like the GAERC, speeches and communiqués by the High Representative 
for  CFSP  (HR),  and  policy  papers  and  reports  put  out  by  both  national  and  Brussels  based 
epistemic  communities.  In  each  of  these  types  of  texts,  I  will  indicate  where  and  how  the 
author(s) are calling for a change of foreign policy identity and what sort of identity they are 
looking for the EU to adopt. I argue that the evidence reviewed below will bear out that the EU’s 
foreign policy objectives, indeed, its international interests have started to change from that of a 
normative power to one that reflects traditional state interest in security, relative power, and 
influence.  The evidence will be divided by sources: institutional documents, HR speeches, and 
textual discourses by the epistemic community. Each will be cited and discussed individually.  
  
 
 
                                                           
    
12 The concept of using the RRF for preventative engagement was introduced in the European Security Strategy, 
2003: 18.  
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Institutional Sources 
 
Council  of  Ministers.  (2004).  General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  Council  (GAERC) 
Meeting  Notes,  January  13-14,  2004,  Brussels:  Council  of  Ministers  Document  Archive, 
retrieved electronically from www.consilium.europe.eu  on October 5
th, 2006. 
 
These notes are summaries of the proceedings of the GAERC, which is the foreign and 
security policy permutation of the Council of Ministers of the European Union. This is the main 
foreign  policymaking  center  of  the  EU.  Much  of  the  current  debate  on  how  the  EU  should 
presents itself to the world in terms of foreign policy and security occurs in these meetings. 
This specific meeting note is important because it contains the actual discussions by the GAERC 
on the European Security Strategy that was adopted by the European Council in December of 
2003. The GAERC voted on whether to adopt this document as the security strategy of the EU. 
Many of the ministers voiced their opinion that EU should become less concerned with normative 
issues and more concerned with traditional foreign and security policy interests. This speaks to 
the central argument of this paper; that the EU’s foreign policy identity is transforming to a more 
traditional, power politics mode. 
 
European  Council.  (2003)  “A  Secure  Europe  in  a  Better  World”,  European  Security 
Strategy.  December  12,  2004,  Brussels:  European  Council  Archives.  Retrieved 
electronically from www.consilium.europe.eu  on October 9
th, 2006. 
 
This is the empirical “smoking gun” for the argument that the identity of the EU foreign 
and  security  policy  is  transforming.  This  important  document  produced  by  the  GAERC  and 
endorsed by the European Council states the security goals of the EU. It is particularly salient to 
the  present  research  because  it  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  EU’s  changing  international 
identity. This security strategy document calls for an increase in the EU’s military capability. It 
also explicitly indicates that the changing security environment may effectively force the EU to 
become more active as a world player in security. This document shows clearly that the EU is 
considering changing its foreign and security identity from a normative based model or “civilian” 
power. The quote used earlier in this paper from the ESS illustrates clearly the call for a more 
aggressive and militarized EU. 
European  Council.  (2004).  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  Report.  Endorsed  by 
European Council. December 2004, Brussels: Netherlands Presidency of European Council. 
Retrieved electronically from www.consilium.europe.eu  on October 9
th, 2006 
 
This  particular  policy  report,  drafted  and  endorsed  by  the  European  Council,  is  key 
because it is the consensus opinion of the heads of each member state. It illustrates the opinion of 
the member states about external relations and, as such, sets the agenda for the policy-making 
institutions of the EU (i.e. GAERC and the entire Council of Ministers). 
  This particular report deals with the issue of the EU’s expanding role as an international 
security actor. It is clear in the discussions of the European Council that influential member states 
like France and the Netherlands want the EU to present an international identity that is strong, 
respected, and independent (from the United States). Again, reiterating the ideas put forth in the 
European  Security  Strategy  (2003),  a  call  is  made  for  expanded  diplomatic  and  military 
capabilities. This is important because it clearly indicates which member states are pushing for a 
change in the EU’s international identity.  
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High Representative for CFSP (Javier Solana) 
 
Solana, J. (2006). Europe’s Answers to the Global Challenges. Speech given by the EU High 
Representative  for  CFSP  at  Copenhagen  University  on  September  8,  2006.  Retrieved 
electronically from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ on September 26, 2006. 
 
  This speech by the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, illustrates that while 
normative power is still Europe’s foreign policy identity, Solana indicates that the EU needs to 
continue to implement the suggestions of the 2003 European Security Strategy and ramp up its 
diplomatic  and  military  capabilities.  Solana  talks  extensively  about  the  EU’s  increasingly 
important role in world affairs. Although not couched in the language of great power politics, 
Solana does emphasize the importance of EU influence in the world and how that may be utilized 
in the securitization of Europe. This speech is important evidence of how some of the EU’s 
foreign  policymaking  elite  have  begun  to  conceptualize  a  different  identity  for  the  EU’s 
international role. 
 
Solana, J. (2003). The Voice of Europe on Security Matters.  Speech given by the EU High 
Representative for CFSP at The Royal Institute for International Relation (IRRI-KIIB), 
Brussels,  November  26,  2003.  Retrieved  electronically  from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ on September 26, 2006. 
 
  This speech which was given just a few weeks before the adoption of the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) is used by Solana to prepare the public for a different type of EU vision. 
While the typical reference to the EU’s identity as a normative force in the world is put forth, 
Solana explicitly states that the EU needs to become more focused and coherent in its security 
policymaking. He believes that the ESS is an important step to this goal because it is a framework 
for  Europe  to  be  more  active,  more  capable  and  more  coherent.  In  his  discussion,  about 
capability, Solana points out that this will entail strengthening the military capabilities of the EU 
and using this military power to fortify its diplomatic competencies.  
This  speech  is  of  utility  for  this  paper  because  it  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  High 
Representative for CFSP has bought into the further transforming of the European foreign policy 
and security orientation toward that of a traditional great power. It is further evidence that this 
orientation has changed. One important note on this speech is Solana’s acknowledgement of the 
role and influence of some key policy institutes (Aspen Institute in Rome, the EU Institute in 
Paris, and the Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm) that contributed and consulted in the 
formulation of the ESS. This is important primary source evidence of the influence of epistemic 
communities in the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy and security orientation. It is direct 
evidence of the inculcation of epistemic communities in the foreign and security policymaking of 
the EU. 
 
Solana, J. (2003). The EU Security Strategy Implications for Europe’s Role in a Changing 
World. Speech given by EU High Representative for CFSP at the Institut fur Europaische 
Politik:  Berlin,  November  12,  2003.  Retrieved  electronically  from 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ on September 26, 2006. 
 
  Again,  the  High  Representative  for  CFSP,  Javier  Solana,  gives  a  speech  about  the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), which would be released in a month (12/13/03). Like the 
speech above, Solana reiterates that the ESS is an important step towards making the EU an 
important  international  actor  because  it  is  a  framework  for  Europe  to  be  more  active,  more 
capable  and  more  coherent.    Key  in  this  speech  is  Solana’s  focus  on  the  EU’s  global 
responsibilities. “As the EU grows to encompass twenty-five countries with some 450 million  
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inhabitants  producing  one  quarter  of  the  world’s  GDP,  we  have  a  duty  to  assume  our 
responsibilities  on  the  world  stage.  As  a  global  actor  the  Union  must  now  face  up  to  its 
responsibility for global security” (Solana, 2003).  
  Again, this speech will be used as prima fascia evidence of the changing nature of the 
way the EU envisions itself on the world stage. As Solana makes clear, the EU needs to take 
direct  action  and  responsibility  for  the  security  and  stability  of  the  international  system  and, 
specifically, for its own security.  
 
Epistemic Communities  
 
Finally, we are able to scrutinize some key epistemic communities. These are Brussels / European 
based transnational policy institutes or think tanks that are part of the policy network. This body 
of  sources  is  important  because  it  illustrates  the  sort  of  information  that  these  epistemic 
communities are inputting into the foreign policymaking network of the EU. Ian Manners (2006) 
has indicated that the epistemic communities listed below have had great effect on the changing 
foreign policy orientation of the EU. While they do not explicitly call for the EU to become and 
act likes a traditional great power (i.e. self-interested, power-seeking, and looking to achieve 
relative gains vis-à-vis its rivals; all for the goal of maximizing its security), they are subtly 
influencing  the  elites  and  policymakers  to  take  steps  toward  strengthening  the  power  and 
capabilities of the EU. As Manners points out in his recent article, these epistemic communities 
call for the prioritization of military capabilities over civilian concerns like human security issues 
such as freedom from fear and want (Manners, 2006, 190). They also call for an active EU on the 
world stage, one that will ultimately compete with Russia, China, and even the United States. 
They are implicitly calling for a great power Europe. 
 
Aspenia  Institute  –  Rome.  Information  retrieved  electronically  from 
http://www.aspeninstitute.it/ on November 11, 2006. 
 
  This private, non-profit foreign policy think tank has been quite vocal in terms of calling 
for a more independent and capable EU as an international player. While based in Rome, it draws 
academics and analysts from all over Europe. It’s stated goal is to provide a forum for Europeans 
to air their concerns about the changing climate of international relations and security. As such, 
this epistemic community produces policy papers on the EU’s foreign and security policy. Many 
of the authors of these papers are vociferous in their call for a Europe that can rival the U.S in 
terms of projecting power internationally. Many of these authors argue that with the growing 
threat of an ever more dictatorial Russia, a unilateral United States, and a failing and dangerous 
Middle East,  the EU needs to be prepared militarily and diplomatically to balance these threats. 
These types of documents are important because they are evidence of the sort of input certain 
European epistemic communities are having on the EU foreign and security policymaking.  
 
 The  European  Union  Institute  for  Security  Studies  (EUISS).  Information  retrieved 
electronically from http://www.iss-eu.org/ on November 11, 2006.  
 
This institute is supported by the EU thorough its second “pillar”- the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy. According to its website, this policy think tank has an autonomous status and 
intellectual freedom; the EUISS does not represent or defend any particular national interest. Its 
aim is to help create a common European security culture, to enrich the strategic debate, and 
systematically to promote the interests of the Union. Its main purpose is to provide forward-
looking analysis for the Union’s Council and High Representative. As such it has great influence 
on the direction and orientation of the EU’s foreign and security policy. 
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Forum Europe of the New Defence Agenda (NDA). Information retrieved electronically from 
http://www.forum-europe.com/ on November 17, 2006. 
 
  This policy forum considers itself a neutral platform for European debate on security and 
defense issues. Yet, it is sponsored by many of the most prominent European defense industry 
contractors (i.e. Honeywell, Finmacchia, Thales, and others). As to be expected, the New Defence 
Agenda calls for a strong European presence on the international stage. In many of the documents 
produced by this forum, a Europe that is militarily equal to any other great power on the world 
stage is advocated. These documents continue to show that the EU is becoming militarily more 
capable to act as independent actor on the world stage and that the EU’s defense contractors are 
instrumental in changing this foreign and security policy orientation. Many important policy and 
advocacy  documents  are  accessible  in  English  from  the  NDA’s  electronic  archive  which  is 
available through their website. 
 
The European Security Forum of CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies). Information 
retrieved electronically from http://www.ceps.be/ on October 30, 2006. 
 
  The European Security Forum is part of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
a Brussels based think tank that is intimately involved in the policy networks of the EU. The 
security  forum  and  the  discourse  produced  by  this  policy  forum  is  generally  seen  as  neo-
conservative.  They  envision  a  Europe  that  is  a  world  power,  politically,  economically,  and 
militarily. In much of the discourse generated by this group, they argue that Europe has all the 
necessary attributes to become a great power. But what is needed in their conceptualization is a 
will or an identity that is markedly different from the civilian or normative power that is generally 
considered the EU’s international identity. Much of the textual or documentary evidence calls for 
the  transformation  of  this  identity  or  grand  strategy.    CEPS  produces  policy  briefs,  position 
papers, special reports, commentaries, and discussions by fellows, of which, most is available 
online through their excellent website. 
 
Aerospace  and  Defence  Industries  Association  of  Europe  (ASD).  Information  retrieved 
electronically from http://www.asd-europe.org/ on October 30, 2006.  
  This  is  a  Brussels  based  lobby  group  that  also  serves  as  a  policy  forum  on  issues 
regarding the European defense and security industry. In this capacity, ASD has called for a 
militarily strong and independent Europe (EU). ASD employs a number of academic or policy 
analysts and produces various forms of texts that deal with the EU’s role in the contemporary 
global stage. Ian Manners has indicated that a military industrial “simplex” has begun to form in 
Brussels and has identified ASD as primary representative of this constituency (Manners, 2006). 
As such, the ASD has had an important impact on EU foreign policymaking.  
  This  type  of  epistemic  community  is  excellent  evidence  that  confirms  the  growing 
influence and input that the defense and security industry has on the general foreign and security 
policy  orientation  of  the  EU.  It  is  illustrative  of  the  sort  of  great  power  discourse  that  is 
influencing the transformation of the EU’s international identity and orientation.  
  This evidence of the influence of epistemic communities is brief because of the space 
constraint of the current this paper. Each of these policy institutes or knowledge-based networks 
have  produced  large  amounts  of  textual  evidence  that  further  solidifies  this  papers  main 
assertions. What is needed is evidence that directly links the martial, strategic, and great power 
discourses of these epistemic communities to the actual policymaking process of the EU. In other 
words, we need more direct links of the sort we saw in the speeches by Javier Solana, which 
literally implicate these policy institutes as the generator of the transformational process the EU is 
undergoing in its international identity. Further investigation is warranted to concretely establish  
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a causal link between the discourse of the various European epistemic communities (independent 
variable) and the transformation of the EU’s foreign policy identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the formation of the EU in 1991, and even in the later days of the EC, Europe has been seen 
and has projected itself as a normative power. It has customarily placed overriding emphasis on 
international law, democracy, human rights, international institutions, and multilateralism in its 
foreign  policy,  while  eschewing  a  foreign  policy  based  on  traditional  national  interests  and 
material  gain.  But  as  this  paper  has  attempted  to  show,  the  foreign  policy  identity  may  be 
changing. Scholars have pointed to the passage of the European Security Strategy as evidence of 
a move to an EU strategic culture. Some, like Ian Manners (2006), have argued that this has 
basically  eroded  the  normative  power  construct  of  the  EU’s  foreign  policy.  It  has  been  the 
argument of this paper that this is transforming the EU’s foreign policy identity to one based on 
traditional great power politics. At the heart of this argument, is the essential influence of a 
burgeoning  group  of  Brussels  based  or  European  epistemic  communities  in  effecting  this 
transformation of the EU’s international identity. 
  While  the  EU’s  military  power  is  continues  to  be  comparatively  negligible  and  its 
capability to project power is still minor, indications like the current ramping up of the Rapid 
Reaction Force’s military capabilities speak to a change to a more “martial” orientation. This 
change is being driven by various factors, of which, the influence of these epistemic communities 
is the most essential. For state’s to change interests, new ideas or policy outlooks must first be 
introduced. As Haas (2003) has indicated, epistemic communities are the channels through which 
these ideas circulate from the society to the state.  Further research is needed to see if these ideas 
generated  by  the  European  epistemic  communities  have  had  a  direct  impact  in  the  foreign 
policymaking  of  the  EU  and,  consequently,  continue  to  transform  the  EU’s  identity    into  a 
twenty-first century great power. 
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